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APPELL.ANT'S REPLY BRil'.J

SCOPE OF BRIEF
~lpptllant mge~ in Point I of his opening brief

that
kl\·e
111

1uasn1L1cl 1 as the i un· determined that Mr. Men~11hsta11tially perf'on;ied the obligations described

Iii~ (·o~t-pl11s C'o11traC't with the Respondent, he was

entitled to a .i udgment base<l upon his actual cost plus
10'"1
He urged that there was no credible evidence
•
frolll which ~lw .iun· l'o11ld reasonablv determine that
the daimed co.~h \\~ere not incurred.· Judgment notI

withstanding the verdict should have been ente reu,·
therefore, in the sum of $49,061.56. (Appellant's Brie:.
pp. 13-24). Respondent atJ:empts, in her Statement 111
Facts and in Point I of the Argument, to point towarl
evidence from which the jury might infer that ;ud
costs were not incurred. Thus the Respondent's Bnet
attempts to argue new matter that was not presenteu
in Appellant's Brief. This Reply Brief, therefore, 1,
filed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 75 (p). Appel·
lant does not waive the arguments made in Points II
through V of his original brief by not reiterating the;n
here or by not replying in detail to other argumenb
contained in the Respondent's Brief.

POINT I.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IGNORES THI
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT APPELLAXT
SUBSTANTIALLY PERFORMED HIS COX·
TRACT.
Respondent refers, on pages 18 and 19 of htr
brief, to the court's Instruction No. 12, as follows:
"In a cost-plus-percentage contract with ~1
licensed builder, an owner has the right_ to expect
the same skill and abilitv to be applied to the
work as would have be~n applied if the c~nd
tractor had undertaken the work for a fixe
price.
. upon t I1e d ef en d an t to establish
The burden 1s
· 8111· !
that he proceeded honestly and skillfully
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with due regard to the rights of the plaintiff.
ln this connection, you are instructed that a contractor does not have the right to expend any
amount of money he sees fit upon such a contract,
regardless of the propriety, necessity or honesty
of the expenditure, but must show that the monies
he daims to have expended were reasonably paid
for materials and work on the job."

Tl1e significance of the instruction is made apparent
11·hen it is laid along side the applicable provisions of
the contract in the instant case. Paragraph G of the
wntract \Exhibit 1) provided:
.. It is mutually agreeable that builder and
owner have a mutual interest, that of building
the best home possible for the owner, and at the
most reasonable cost possible ,and that all efforts
shall be expended in this direction."
Paragraph E of the agreement provided in substance tnat the owner should assume the responsibility
ul' actp1iring Lids and submitting them to the owner
IJ<"fore a 11 ards are made to subcontractors, and that the
U1e owner should have the right to accept or reject bids.
Paragraph C p;·ovided an accounting procedure wherehr statemeuts were t(J be submitted by the contractor
to tlic owner within a reasonable time. In Instruction
Xo. rn, The court instructed the jury that in order to
tind that Appellant had substantially performed under
the contract, he
.
. must 1n·ove by a preponderance of the
e\'1deuce that he ( 1) exercised reasonable skill
and judgment in letting subcontracts, in per-
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forming his own work, and in supervising hi,
workmen an? s~bcontractors; ( 2) performed
the construction m a reasonable time; (3\ rendered statements reasonably; and ( 4) exerte
his . best efforts toward constructing the Shu~:
residence at the most reasonable cost possible."
The jury found, in answer to Special Interrogator 1
No. I, that the Appellant substantially performed !us
obligations under the contract ( R. 133). Respondent
admits that this finding by the jury is supported by
the evidence. (cf Respondent's Brief, p. 2).
Integrating the court's Instruction No. 12 with
the applicable provisions of the contract, therefore, it
is admitted on this appeal that the Appellant "pr11·
ceeded honestly and skillfully and with due regard t11
the right of the plaintiff"; that the contractor did not
expend any amount of money, regardless of propriety.
but he showed that the amount of money he claimed
to have expended was reasonably paid for materiab
and work on the job. (cf. Instruction No. 12.) If he
had not performed these obligations, then under the
instructions of the court the jury could not have found
that he substantially performed the contract.

It is this undisputed fact that distinguishes the
11
authorities cited by the Respondent on pages 19. ~
and 21 of her brief. In Shaw v. Bula Cannon Shops
Inc., 205 Miss. 458, 38 So. (2d) 916, the court held i!i
substance that if the contractor did not substantiall)·
perform on a cost-plus contract, t he cont rac t or should
be awarded only a reasonable cost. The quotation fron:
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I

...ill

the case

page 20 of Respondent's Brief makes this
po~ition clear. In Walsh Services v. Feek (1954), 45
Ir ash. (~d) 289. 27 4 P. ( 2d) 117, the court determined
explicitly that the cost-plus contractor had not performed un<ler his contract; that the work was not given
adequate or proper supervision, and that the contractor
added some extras which were not authorized. In the
Walsh S ercice case the trial court made specific findings of fact refiecting which items were allowed on a
cost-plus basis and which items were disallowed. The
contractor knew specifically which bills were deemed
to be excessiw and which items were approved by the
trial judge. Cases cited by Appellant on page 21 of
his brief are to the same effect. Some of these cases
actually support the Appellant's position here. Wendell 0. Ma,ijlJury ( 1954) 75 So. ( 2d) 379, for example,
awards the contractor the exact amount of his costs
plus 10~~ after deducting for two specific items which
\\'ere in dispute. There, as here, there was a dispute
as to the provisions of the contract. After holding
that the rn11tract was on a cost-plus basis, and determining that specific items were not recoverable, the
contractor was mvarded judgment in the appropriate
amount. The courts have held that where the contractor
has not fulfilled the obligations imposed, either under
the term~ of the contract or by law, that he is entitled
to recoyer based upon reasonable costs rather than
cost-plus. Courts have also held that a cost-plus contractor has the same obligations as a fixed-fee contractor in exercising reasonable judgment with respect
to costs incurred.
011
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In the case at bar, there is a specific, undisputeri
finding that Menlove Construction Company satisfit, 1
its obligation. The contractor constructed the '·best
home possible for the owner and at the most reasonah
cost possible." (cf. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).
The instances of claimed default by the contractor.
as referred to particularly on page 16 of Respondent,
brief, were necessarily considered by the jury and wm
necessarily rejected insofar ~s they were offered fw
the purpose of showing that the Appellant had not
substantially performed.
In Point III of this brief, Appellant demonstrates
that each of the deficiencies upon which Respondent
relies was actually approved or ratified during the
course of construction. The record-keeping procedure1
were approved; invoices reflecting the items now ~eize1:
upon as "non-cost" items were paid. Respondent i·
being charged with failure to require Max l\Ienlor.
to spend more time on the job while complaining !liar
the cost of Max Menlove's time is excessive. (cf. Re·
spondent's Brief, pp. 6, 7, 16). Yet Respondent paid
invoices in evidence as Exhibits 5 through 8 where the
time rate of Max :Menlove was explicitly stated.
Appellant submits that the arguments made hi
Respondent on page 16 of her brief, and the fact~
referred to on pages 4 to 13 might properly hare been
considered on the basic question as to whether Appel·
lant substantially performed, but they are not coui·
petent in considering the issue of actual costs. It
6

,\ ppdlant is denied recovery of specific items, he is
cutitled to know what they are so that he can protect
himself "·itb suppliers and subcontractors accordingly .
. \t ~hi~ juncture Respondent is bound by the jury's
dettrmination that ~Ir . .:'\Ienlove (I) exercised reasonable skill and judgment in letting subcontracts, in per·,<lrming bis own work and in supervising his workmen
awl subcontractors; ( 2) performed the construction
in a reaso11a ble time; ( 3) rendered statements reasonably; all<I I J) exerted his best efforts toward constructing the re~i<lence at the most reasonable cost possible.
\cf Instruction 19, R. 112). Moreover, the Respondent
is precluded from asserting that the specific reqmrements of Exhibit l were not satisfied.

POINT II.
HESPONDENT IGNORES THE lJNDISPl'TED FACT THAT THE ONLY CONTRACT
H.E'l'WEE~ THE PARTIES WAS THAT APPELLX:\TT \VOULD BE COMPENSATED
lUSED CPON HIS COSTS PLUS TEN PER
l'ENT.

At the trial court level the Respondent initially
iiiok the position that there was an oral agreement to
the effect that the Appellant had agreed to construct
the house for the sum of $35,200.00 ( R. 46, 50). At
tlte condusio11 of the Respondent's evidence the court
rule <l exp 1·1c1t
· 1y that there was no such oral agreement.
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In explaining his reasonmg on the ruling, the trial
court said:
"F~equently in. testimony, Mr. Shupe referreii
~o this as an eshma.te and I think that's what

'

it was. As he described it, and further she, a)
the contracting party, and she was not there at
the time when this was done and there is prob·
lems of agency that would appear invoh·ed but
haven't even been discussed by counsel so for
as that problem is concerned. I think this is a
classic case where the parol eYidence rule should
apply ... I think that the claim must die at this
point." (R. 487, 488).
The court explained that the only justification for
considering any evidence of the early com·ersations
between the parties was to determine whether the Ap·
pellant had substantially performed his contract. He
summarized: "If a jury should determine that there
was substantial performance why then there would he
only the question of offset." (R. 489).
In spite of this record at the trial level, the Re·
spondent continues to refer to the initial preliminan·
conversations between the parties. (See Respondenh
Brief, pp. 3, 4, 5, and 16).
The Appellant submits that, under the theory
· on
most favorable to Respondent, the only bas1s up
which the original cost estimates have any probatire
force are on the issue as to whether the Appellant
substantially performed under the contract. 'fhe jnrr
.
.
has determmed
that question
a d verse1y t o Respondent
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1

and Respondent does not contest the jury's finding on
tliis appeal. The jury's determination that the Appellant substantially performed is dis positive with respect
to the issue. The Respondent is asking this court to
place credence upon the very evidence which the jury
rejected in determining the primary issue in the case.
It is important that the court realize that the issue

of substantial performance was deemed to be the controlling issue at the trial level. Respondent continues
to refer to the fact that there are three volumes of
testimony (Respondent's Brief, p. 14); that there were
sixty-nine exhibits (Respondent's Brief, p. 4) ; that
the Respondent called seven witnesses and the Appellant twenty-six witnesses during seven days of trial
(ibid). The purpose of these witnesses and the necessity for their being called and examined at the trial
was to prove that the Appellant had substantially
performed. It was necessary to examine each subcontrador and supplier of material as to the nature
of his relationship with the Appellant. Each major
:rnb-contractor was called as a witness and testified in
substance and effect that he had received the same
kind of supervision and instruction from Mr. Menlove
as he ordinarily received from contractors constructing
custom houses. The sub-contractors testified as to the
conyersations they had with .Mr. Shupe concerning
the apprornl of the sub-contract and the selection of
the materials and the supervision of the sub-contractor's
acfaities h>· .:Ur. Menlove as general contractor. The
Re~pondent made all of these issues relevant by the
9

position she took prior to trial. The Respondent had
in her possession and available for examination by her
accountants and lawyers all of the actual records rif
the Appellant for approximately a year prior to the
trial and, as stated in Appellant's Brief. She was unable
to state a single item which did not actually represent
a cost incurred ( R. 27) . Now having put the Appellant
to the trouble and expense of proving each one of tht
claims in detail, Respondent attempts to benefit in
her brief from the fact that all of the witnesses and
all of the evidence pointed toward the conclusion that
the Respondent was erroneous and mistaken in alleging that there was no substantial performance under
the contract.
Recapitulating on this point, the Respondent'~
failure to reckon with the finding of the jury on the
major substantive problem involved in the lawsuit c011·
stitutes an attempt to divert the attention of this court
from the legal issue involved on appeal. The Respond·
ent's recitations of the original conversations betweeu
the parties are wholly immaterial. They are misleading.
There was no agreement that the cost oi the house
was limited to $35,200.00, or any other figure. The
entire control of the costs of this house was with the
Shupes. After having personally selected all of the
items that went into the house the Shupes are now ask·
.
. a JU
. d gmen t w h'ch
required
mg
the court to sustam
1
that Mr. Menlove pay for substantially $6,000.00 worth
of these costs with his own money.
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POINT III.
THE RESPONDENT APPROVED THE

\'EHY JlllOCEDURES AND COSTS \VHICH
SHE N"O\\ .\.SSERTS JUSTIFY THE JURY'S

rERDICT.
On pages ti through 8 of his original brief, the
Appellant demonstrated from the record that Mr.
and }lrs. Shupe approved each sub-contract for each
phase of construction and that they actually selected
all of the items of any consequence that went into the
house. ~o purpose would be served by listing these
items or even tabulating them here. It is of substantial
significance that the Respondent does not in her brief
refer to a single sub-contract or fixture or other item
of construction which was not approved either by her
or her husband.

The Respondent's Brief, however, refers to a
number of procedures upon which Respondent presumably relies i11 justifying the jury's verdict. On pages
± et sey_. of lier Statement of Facts, and Page 16 of
her .1rgumeut. Respondent refers to a series of procedures a1cd iustances presumably relevant to the question of 5Uostantial performance. Although these items
are not belieyed material on the question of actual
co~ts, they are treated briefly. For the purpose of conrenieuee, these items are numbered and comment is
made upon them as follows:
I. Respondent asserts that she should not haYe
been charged for social security taxes, payroll taxes,
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unemployment compensation and similar wage cos(,
(Respondent's Brief, p. 4). The answer to this contention is that she paid four invoices where these cosrs
were itemized. (Ex. 5, pp. 1-2; Ex. 6, p. 6; Ex. 7,
p. 1). Mr. Menlove explanied that it was his practiri·
to add payroll taxes (which include all of the items Iii
question) to costs on a cost-plus contract; that if he
did not do so he actually would lose money upon the
cost of the labor. (R. 339, 340).
2. Respondent claims that .Max Menlove did nut
spend enough time on the job and that, therefore, h~
was not adequately supervising the men. (Respondent\
Brief, p. 6). In this argument, the Respondent is
totally inconsistent. On the one hand she urges that
the labor costs, one of which was the time for "·hich
Max Menlove was compensated, were too high; on the
other hand she contends that they were not high enough
- that because Max Menlove was supervising other
construction, he was not on the job at the Shupe construction. The question of adequate superrision iras
one of the main issues presented to the jury with respect
to the question as to whether the Appellant substautially performed the contract. The jury's finding on
the issue is conclusive. Moreover, the record is clear
that at no time during construction did l\Ir. Shupe
complain that Max Menlove did not spend sufficient
time on the premises. ( R. 250) .
3. Respondent asserts that different kinds. 01
records were kept on the Shupe job concerning the :nne
spent by employees than were kept on other krnd'
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d work. (Respoudent's Brief, p. 6). This contention
is absolutely inaccurate. The undisputed testimony is
that thf same records were kept on all housing jo.bs.
(R. :W5). It is true that Max Menlove testified that
on cost-plus jobs the labor costs as other costs were
substantiali,v eon trolled by the owner. (R. 267). The
record substantiates the observation. Mr. Shupe
visited the premises nearly every day and gave
repeated and detailed suggestions to the employees
and l\Iax concerning the manner in which the work
should be done (R. 292). Frequent change orders
required that part of the work be done over. (See examples in Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-9). Respondent does
not dispute the fact that at least 100 changes and additions were made during construction (R. 884).
4. Respondent asserts that "sometimes competitive
prices were obtained and sometimes they weren't".
\Respondents Brief, p. 7. On pages 6 through 9 of
his original brief, Appellant detailed the instances
where Mr. Shupe personally approved each sub-contract and each major item of construction. If there
were instances where competitive bids were waived by
the Shupes, such waiver is binding upon them and
they are in no position to now assert that a competitive
bir:l should haw been obtained. This is particularly
true wliere the jury found that the Appellant substantially performed the agreement. (cf. Instructions
12-2\J ind., R. 105-113). Respondent is unable to cite
a single instance where she did not approve the arrangement with a subcontractor.
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5. Respondent asserts that the connete joli 1 ,
eluded OYertime. (Respondent's Brief. p. 8 i. ·n,
concrete work was performed during Deeember. JUii:
and January, 1963. l 11 Yo ices for this work was ~uL.
mitted during the following months. (See Ex ..5, p.;
Ex. ()). These inniices were paid.
6. Respondent complains that no eost breakdo1111
was made. (Respondent" s Brief. p. 7). It is a rurn1 11 ,
thing that the Hespondent asserts that the i11rniet,
receiYed in e,·idence as Exhibits J through U indu111t
are sufficent to enable the jury to determine ,,iJelhtr

the costs incurred by the Appellant are amply itemized
(see Respondent's Brief, pp. :W-:2i). an<l that no cu1t
breakdown was rec1uired to assist the jury in determin·
ing the application of the cost to the rnriou~ pha'tl
of construction (Ibid). A ml yet. the Appellant. i
general contractor with some 30 years' experience. :mi
)lr. Shupe, a ciYil engineer with some 40 ~-ears' expen·
ence, who supen·ised the design of the premi~es anl
personally approyed each and eyery item of eow,trncl: 111
as it occurred, requirecl a cost breakdown to anah:'
the costs as they were being incurred. If these di.i·
paratiYe positions do not amply demonstrate that 1.1'
1
Respondent is grasping at straws, it should he obserrei,
that after haYing all of the actual records of the ..\ppel·
· to t l w t na
· l . Re~·pondenl
lant for more than a year prior

.

.

.

1

·l .c.:11 w·1' n111

was unable to 1tem1ze a smg e expense " 11
'·
necessarilv incurred by Appellant during the rouN
• .
•
of constructwn.
( I{. '27;
c f . ~ \ ppe 11 an t'.s Brief · p11.
10-11).
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I. Hespolldeuts assert that the painter was not

adequately "upenised and that the labor for the paintincr1" 1ras exc:essiYe. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8). The
painter rnnde an estimate of $1680.00 (R. 669). The
te~tunony i~ urnli.->puted that .Mr. Shupe was advised
that the pamter was to be compensated on a time and
material basi~ R. 248, ~49). The paint schedule was
actually prepared by the Shupes after conferences
betwet:l tnem an<l the architect, George Cannon Young,
and the Sim pes · decor a tor, Marion Cornwall ( R. 47 4.J.7()). The painter was a man of 18 years' experience
a~ a professional painter (R. 668). He testified that
the Shupes and the interior decorator directed him
with respect tu the types of finishes to be applied and
that lie applied the kind and amount of paint which
they ordered ( R. 672 et seq.). Respondent objects
that the painter and his employees were paid by checks
issued b)· th<e ~..\ppellant. (Respondent's Brief, p. 7).
It is submitted, hcm·eyer, that there is no basis for the
complaint and that the workmen were paid directly
b:1 :1Ienlon· Construction Company. "Thether the
painter and his employees were paid by the painter
<Lid tLe paillter reimbursed by .Menlove Construction Company would not result in a particle of differenc2 iu cost to the Respondent. The painter's employees \Vere men of 18 years or more experience as
professionals i R. fi!l8). \\'hen :Mr. Thompson learned
of tl1e kind of finishes tu he used upon the balcony of
the ho11se he told )lr. Shupe and .Mr. MenloYe that
thel'l 11 1 11ild be additional easts of about $200.00 (R.
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690). Appellant submits that the cost of the paint w:i,
the result of the exacting tastes of the Shupes: )Ii
l\Ienlove should not be penalized for them.
8. Respondent labors at length her ,·arious com.
plaints with respect to alleged sub-standard or faulti
construction. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-ia 1. Th.t

complete answers to all of the minutia of detail recited
in the brief is that Carl Ohran, the plaintiffs own
expert witness, testified in substance that in his opinion
such items as were complained of would all be corned
by the sum of $1,200 to $1,500 ( R. 353) . After con·
sidering all of the applicable testimony on the subject,
the jury determined that the plaintiff was entitled
to an offset because of defective construction and delay
in construction in the sum of $1,230 ( R. 133). Appel·
lant concedes the validity of this finding for the purpost
of argument on this appeal. (cf. Appellant's B:ief.
p. 12). Appellant submits that Respondent cann(li
claim the amount of the off set as found by the jury
and at the same time use the very items imolred i11
the offset as an excuse for payment the full amou;~·
of the cost of construction. Respondent has alrea<l:,
been allowed the total amount due as a result of any
defective or inadequate construction. The argument
·
that the same items should be tak en mto
account J11
diminishing the recovery on the cost-plus 10% contract
is erroneous and misleading.
9. Respondent de11ies in her brief that l\Ir. aun
J1 plr1se
f

:Mrs. Shupe approved each sub-contract or eac

16
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of construction. (Respondent's Brief, p. 13). However,
ueither the Respondent's Brief nor any testimony
n<lriuced by the Respondents at the trial tend to refute
the detailed tnstances of approval of each of the subcontractors and each of the items of construction as
referred to in pages 6 through 8 of the Appellant's
Brief.
The following colloquy occurred during the crossexamination of }Ir. Shupe:

"(-l. 3Ir. Shupe, you approved the putting of
laminated sheet rock in the house, did you not?
A. Yes.
C-.l. And it's true, isn't it, that there were diseussions with either iVIax or Roy about everything that went into the house as it was being
built'.
A. Yes. There may have been some things
that were not discussed.
Q. '.Yell. isn't it vour best recollection that
therP was a diseussion with one or the other
about eYerything that went into the house?
A. Not everything. I think that would be
uncalled for.
Q. Inviting your attention again to your
deposition, ~Ir. Shupe, page 51. The question
was. 'Q. "~as there any discussion with either
~lax or Rov .Menlove about the redwood beams
that were ;1sed in construction. A. Of course,
~here was discussion about ever;ljthing that went
wto the place. No doubt there was discussion
about it.' Did you make that answer at that time?

A. Yes." (Emphasis supplied).
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This testimony must be compared with the respoihi
Respondent made to an interrogatory propoundcii
more than 14 months after the construction was completed and approximately 12 months after Responde 11
had been given copies of all of the Appellant's recordi:
"Interrogatory No. 5: Itemize in detail the
expenses which plaintiff claims were unnece\sarily incurred by the Defendant as alleged in
paragraph number 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
"Answer: The plaintiff is unable at the pre)·
ent time to itemize in detail the expenses whil'i1
were unnecessarily incurred by the defendant."
Appellant submits that while it is true that }fr
Shupe equivocated to some extent in his dired examnation, the record demonstrates that he and his 11.lt
approved the very procedures which they now clain1
justify paying an amount approximately ~li,000.ilil
less than the Appellant's costs.

SUMMARY AND CON CL CS I OX
In his opening brief, the Appellant asserted i :
substance that there was no substantial evidence frorn
which the jury could find that any of the costs claimeil
by the defendant were not actually incurred. State,!
differently, Appellant claims that the jury was per·
mitted by the trial court to stubbornly refuse to nt
guided bv competent, credible evidence and that tlw
• should have awarded a JU
· <lgmen t 11 otwitl1·
trial court
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standing the Yerdict in a sum equal to Appellant's
actual cu-;t plus 10%. This Reply Brief has demon~traced that the arguments made by the Respondent
in support <Jf the jury's finding are fallacious. The
jury's determination as to defendant's costs plus 10%
is not supported by the evidence. The arguments made
bv the Respondent might conceivably have supported
a :finding by the jury to the effect that the reasonable
1·osts of construction were $43,000.00, if the jury had
been permitted to speculate upon that theory. The
jmf~ finding that the contract was substantially performed pre,rented their speculating upon the theory
of reasoEable costs. The result achieved by the jury
in re;;ponse to the first interrogatory is necessarily in·
consistent with the jury's determination that the costs
of construction were only $43,000.00. Either the court
should haYe granted the Appellant a judgment not11ithstanding the wrdict or it should have awarded him
a ne" trial limited solely to the question of damages.
Appellant submits that the positions taken by the
Respondent in her brief reinforce and amplify Appellant's contention.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th
day of March, 1966.
GEORGE l\I. McMILLAN and
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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